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Block encryption of quantum messages
Min Liang and Li Yang
Abstract
In modern cryptography, block encryption is a fundamental cryptographic primitive. However, it is impossible for block
encryption to achieve the same security as one-time pad. Quantum mechanics has changed the modern cryptography, and lots of
researches have shown that quantum cryptography can outperform the limitation of traditional cryptography.
This article proposes a new constructive mode for private quantum encryption, named EHE , which is a very simple method
to construct quantum encryption from classical primitive. Based on EHE mode, we construct a quantum block encryption
(QBE) scheme from pseudorandom functions. If the pseudorandom functions are standard secure, our scheme is indistinguishable
encryption under chosen plaintext attack. If the pseudorandom functions are permutation on the key space, our scheme can achieve
perfect security. In our scheme, the key can be reused and the randomness cannot, so a 2n-bit key can be used in an exponential
number of encryptions, where the randomness will be refreshed in each time of encryption. Thus 2n-bit key can perfectly encrypt
O(n2n) qubits, and the perfect secrecy would not be broken if the 2n-bit key is reused for only exponential times.
Comparing with quantum one-time pad (QOTP), our scheme can be the same secure as QOTP, and the secret key can be
reused (no matter whether the eavesdropping exists or not). Thus, the limitation of perfectly secure encryption (Shannon’s theory)
is broken in the quantum setting. Moreover, our scheme can be viewed as a positive answer to the open problem in quantum
cryptography “how to unconditionally reuse or recycle the whole key of private-key quantum encryption”. In order to physically
implement the QBE scheme, we only need to implement two kinds of single-qubit gates (Pauli X gate and Hadamard gate), so
it is within reach of current quantum technology.
Index Terms
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I. INTRODUCTION
THE combination of quantum mechanics and information science forms a new science – quantum information science, inwhich the information extends to quantum information. The requirement of processing quantum information occurs, and
we have to develop quantum cryptographic technology for quantum information, e.g. encryption of quantum information. Since
the quantum information can be seen as an extension of classical information in complex Hilbert space, the cryptographic
schemes for quantum information are suitable for classical information, but not vice versa.
Quantum information encryption is a kind of basic quantum cryptographic primitive, especially the quantum one-time pad
(QOTP), which has been applied in various quantum cryptographic schemes. For example, the quantum message authentication
(QMA) is applied in the constructions of secure multiparty quantum computation [1] and quantum interactive proof [2], and
the authenticity of QMA can be guaranteed by quantum encryption [3].
QOTP (or private quantum channel) [4]–[7] is the first kind of quantum information encryption scheme, which uses preshared
classical symmetric key and has perfect security. However, the secret key cannot be reused. The recycling issues of QOTP-key
have been studied in some literatures [8]. Zhou et al. propose another symmetric-key encryption algorithm [9], which uses
quantum-classical hybrid keys.
Public-key encryption of quantum messages is firstly studied by Yang [10], in which both the public key and private key are
classical. Because the scheme is constructed based on NP-complete problem, it has computational security at the most. Later,
public-key encryption schemes with computational security are studied in more literatures [11]–[13]. In addition, public-key
encryption with information-theoretic security is also studied [14], [15].
Alagic et al. [16] propose a private-key scheme and a public-key encryption scheme for quantum data, both of which have
computational security. The private-key scheme is constructed based on quantum pseudorandom function (PRF) and QOTP, but
it is not indistinguishable against chosen ciphertext attack. The public-key scheme is constructed based on quantum trapdoor
one-way permutation and QOTP.
There are some literatures about QMA [3], [17], [18] or non-malleable quantum encryption [19], [20]. Because authenticity
of QMA implies encryption [3], those secure quantum authentication schemes can also be used as quantum message encryption
scheme; However, the secret key cannot be reused or can be recycled partially.
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2Fig. 1. Construction of quantum block encryption scheme E(F,G). The rectangles represent cryptographic primitives or related computational steps. The
elliptic frames represent plaintext space or ciphertext space. The gray frames represent the detailed procedure of the scheme E(F,G): the quantum message
in space M1 is encrypted using the first scheme E
′(F ), and then be transformed using H, and finally be encrypted using the second scheme E ′(G).
A. Our Results
We present a detailed description of EHE encryption. In the notation “EHE”, each E represents a different quantum encryption
operation, and H represents a transversal Hadamard transformation. Actually, QOTP can be viewed as a special case of EHE
encryption, where each E is implemented by encrypting quantum superpositions using classical one-time pad.
Based on two PRFs, we construct a secure quantum block encryption (QBE) scheme in the form of EHE encryption. The
idea is described in Fig.1. E(F ) and E(G) are two classical block encryption (BE) schemes that are constructed based on two
PRFs F and G. E ′(F ) and E ′(G) are insecure QBE schemes that are constructed using E(F ) and E(G). The whole procedure
of quantum encryption E(F,G) : σ ∈ M1 → ρ ∈ C2 can be finished in the three steps: (1) the quantum message σ ∈ M1
is encrypted using the first QBE scheme E ′(F ), and the obtained ciphertext is ρ1 ∈ C1; (2) perform transversal Hadamard
transformation on ρ1 ∈ C1, and obtain ρ2 ∈ C′1; (3) If C′1 ⊆ M2, then ρ2 ∈ M2 can be encrypted using the second QBE
scheme E ′(G), and the obtained ciphertext is ρ ∈ C2.
We study the security of QBE scheme E(F,G), and obtain the main results as follows.
Theorem 1 (informal): If PRFs F,G are chosen independently and have standard security in the quantum computation setting,
then E(F,G) is an IND-CPA-secure QBE scheme.
Theorem 2 (informal): F,G are independent PRFs with standard security. If both F and G are permutations on the key
space, then E(F,G) is a perfectly secure QBE scheme.
Theorem 1 states that our QBE scheme can be IND-CPA-secure. The plaintext block has the same length as ciphertext
block. Theorem 2 states that, in some particular case, the QBE scheme can have the same security as QOTP even if the
keys are reused. Thus, our scheme can be viewed as a positive answer to an open problem in quantum cryptography “how to
unconditionally reuse or recycle the whole key of private-key quantum encryption”, which has been studied in Refs. [8], [17],
[18], [21]–[23].
QOTP has been widely applied in the theoretical design of various quantum encryption and authentication schemes [1]–[3],
[14], [18]. Based on our results, we can consider modifying those QOTP-based schemes by replacing QOTP with perfectly
secure QBE, and expect an obvious optimization, for example, recycling all the keys of the scheme in Ref. [18] or lifting weak
authentication to total authentication [17].
B. Related works
1) How to construct quantum cryptographic primitives from classical ones: Based on quantum mechanics, the information
extends to quantum information, and the computation extends to quantum computation. A natural question is whether or not
the modern cryptography based on the information and computation could extend to quantum cryptography. Concretely, how to
extend classical cryptographic primitive to quantum one? Our results give an answer from the aspect of BE (or pseudorandom
functions). In addition, there are also some other related works.
In Ref. [10], a quantum public-key encryption scheme is proposed based on classical McEliece public-key cryptosystem.
Later, more constructions are proposed [11]. In order to improve the security, Yang and Liang [13] propose the double-encryption
technique, which is the origin of EHE encryption.
Garg et al. [17] propose the “Auth-QFT-Auth” pattern used to construct QMA scheme (denoted as Auth2(H(Auth1(ρ)))),
where Auth1, Auth2 are the classical Wegman-Carter MAC schemes and H is the quantum Hadamard transform. Obviously,
this pattern is very similar to EHE encryption.
In fact, QOTP can be viewed as an EHE-like construction based on classical OTP: quantum states are encrypted using the
classical one-time pad in the basis {|0〉, |1〉}, and then using the classical one-time pad in the basis {|+〉, |−〉}.
The most related work is Ref. [16], which propose a computationally secure framework for quantum encryption. However,
their construction uses “PRF+QOTP” mode, and our construction uses EHE mode. In the spirit, EHE mode is a special
combination of two insecure encryption. This mode of combination can be extended to construct more quantum cryptographic
schemes.
32) Quantum encryption with key recycling: OTP is a perfectly secure encryption scheme, but the key cannot be reused;
In BE scheme, the key can be reused, but the security is weaker than OTP. In quantum cryptography, there exists the same
problem: QOTP has the same security as OTP, but the key cannot be reused (Though we can use a QOTP with quantum
key distribution, this would need more rounds of interaction and more communication.). In order to settle this problem, the
researchers begin to consider how to recycle part of the keys or conditionally reuse the keys.
Damgard et al. [21], [22] show how to encrypt a classical message in a quantum state and recycle the key. Oppenheim and
Horodecki [8] study how to encrypt a quantum message and recycle the key, and the key of QOTP can only be partially reused.
Fehr and Salvail [23] propose a classical-message-oriented quantum authentication scheme with key recycling, in which the
partial randomness can be extracted and be used as the OTP-key or QOTP-key. Then the combination of the authentication
scheme and OTP (or QOTP) becomes a quantum encryption scheme with key recycling, and can be used to encrypt the classical
or quantum information.
There are also some researches about QMA with key recycling [17], [18]. The “Auth-QFT-Auth” authentication scheme [17]
allows conditionally recycling part of the keys: the inner key can be recycled upon successful verification, and the outer key
unfortunately cannot be. Because any scheme to authenticate quantum messages must also encrypt them [3], these authentication
schemes can also be used as encryption schemes with key recycling.
In all these schemes, the keys cannot be totally reused, and we will solve this problem through QBE scheme.
C. Organization
In Section II, we introduce some basic notations, and review three kinds of PRFs. In Section II-C, we describe the EHE
encryption technique. In Section III, we show how to construct IND-CPA-secure QBE scheme, and prove the perfectly secure
scheme is achievable. Finally, we conclude and discuss these results.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Notations and definitions
Funcn = {f |f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n} denotes the set of all the functions that map n bits to n bits. Define YX as the set of
functions {f |f : X → Y}, then Funcn = NN , where N = {0, 1}n.
Any classical computable function f ∈ YX can be implemented by a quantum computer, or be implemented as an oracle
which is queried on quantum superpositions.
Uf :
∑
x∈X ,y∈Y
αx,y|x〉|y〉 −→
∑
x∈X ,y∈Y
αx,y|x〉|y ⊕ f(x)〉, (1)
where X and Y are the domain and range, respectively. ∑x∈X ,y∈Y can be briefly written as ∑x,y without leading to any
misunderstanding.A|f〉 represents the quantum adversary A can access to f with quantum superposition queries. Af represents
the (classical or quantum) adversary A can access to f classically
Of : (x, y)→ (x, y ⊕ f(x)), ∀x ∈ X , y ∈ Y. (2)
PRF is the basic primitive in modern cryptography. A PRF is a polynomial-time computable function F : K × X → Y ,
where K, X and Y are the key space, the domain and range, respectively. Denote K×X = {(k, x) : k ∈ K, x ∈ X}. K,X ,Y
are implicit functions of the security parameter n. We write y = Fk(x) or y = F (k, x).
Definition 1 (PRF): A function F : K × X → Y is PRF, if for any probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) adversary A, the
advantage of A while distinguishing between a truly random function f and the function Fk for a uniformly chosen k
AdvPRFF (A) ,
∣∣∣∣∣ Pr
k
R←−K
[AFk() = 1]− Pr
f
R←−Funcn
[Af () = 1]
∣∣∣∣∣
is negligible. We write k
R←− K to represent the key k is drawn from K uniformly and randomly. f R←− Funcn represents the
function f is uniformly chosen from Funcn. The notations can be briefly written as k ← K and f ← Funcn.
“ǫ(n) is negligible” means that, for any polynomial p(n), there exists n0 such that ǫ(n) <
1
p(n) , ∀n > n0.
Pauli X gate and Z gate can be represented as: X =
(
0 1
1 0
)
, Z =
(
1 0
0 −1
)
, and Hadamard gate is H =
1√
2
(
1 1
1 −1
)
. Given any unitary matrix U and a n-bit string b = b1b2 · · · bn (bi is the i-th bit of the string b), we
write U b to denote
⊗n
i=1 U
bi . Particularly, U⊗n =
⊗n
i=1 U = U
11···1.
For two n-bit strings a, b ∈ {0, 1}n, define a⊙ b =∑ni=1 aibi(mod2).
We write [[pk, Uk, k ∈ K]] to represent a quantum message encryption scheme that performs encryption operator Uk and
decryption operator U †k using the symmetric key k ∈ K, where k is chosen with probability pk and cannot be reused. Then
QOTP can be described by the notation [[pab =
1
22n , X
aZb, a, b ∈ {0, 1}n]].
4B. Quantum pseudorandom functions
Following the definitions in Ref. [24], there are two security notions of PRF under quantum computation model. The first
notion is standard security, where the quantum adversary can only access to the function classically; We denote this kind of
PRF as “sPRF”. The second one is quantum security, where the quantum adversary can access to the function with quantum
superposition queries; We denote this kind of PRF as “qPRF”.
Definition 2 (sPRF): A PRF F : K×X → Y is standard secure, if no quantum polynomial-time (QPT) adversary A making
classical queries can distinguish between a truly random function f and the function Fk for a uniformly chosen k. That is, for
every such A, there exists a negligible function ǫ = ǫ(n) such that∣∣∣∣ Prk←K[AFk() = 1]− Prf←Funcn[Af () = 1]
∣∣∣∣ < ǫ.
Definition 3 (qPRF): A PRF F : K × X → Y is quantum secure, if no QPT adversary A making quantum queries can
distinguish between a truly random function f and the function Fk for a uniformly chosen k. That is, for every such A, there
exists a negligible function ǫ = ǫ(n) such that∣∣∣∣ Prk←K[A|Fk〉() = 1]− Prf←Funcn[A|f〉() = 1]
∣∣∣∣ < ǫ.
For sPRF F , define AdvsPRFF (A) =
∣∣Prk←K[AFk() = 1]− Prf←Funcn [Af () = 1]∣∣. For qPRF F , define AdvqPRFF (A) =∣∣Prk←K[A|Fk〉() = 1]− Prf←Funcn [A|f〉() = 1]∣∣, where A is QPT adversary.
When quantum queries are allowed, QPT adversary has more advantage while distinguishing PRF and truly random function.
That is AdvsPRFF (A) < AdvqPRFF (A). If AdvqPRFF (A) < ǫ(n), then AdvsPRFF (A) < ǫ(n), where ǫ(n) is negligible. Thus, if
a PRF F is a qPRF, then it is also a sPRF.
How to directly construct a sPRF that is not a qPRF? In fact, Even-Mansour block cipher is a sPRF [25], but it is not a
qPRF [26]. In addition, CBC-MAC is also not quantum-secure as a PRF [27].
Lemma 1: Given a function G, if G is independent of PRF {Fk}k∈K, then∣∣∣∣ Prk←K[AFk,G() = 1]− Prf←Funcn[Af,G() = 1]
∣∣∣∣ < ǫ(n),
where A is any PPT adversary and ǫ(n) is negligible.
Proof: Define a new quantum adversary AG, where the adversary A is allowed to access to the function G classically.
Because G is independent of {Fk}k∈K, we have∣∣∣∣ Prk←K[AFk,G() = 1]− Prf←Funcn[Af,G() = 1]
∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣ Prk←K[AFkG () = 1]− Prf←Funcn[AfG() = 1]
∣∣∣∣ = AdvPRFF (AG).
Fk is a PRF, so Adv
PRF
F (AG) is negligible. Thus complete the proof.
There are two similar results for sPRF and qPRF, respectively.
Lemma 2: Given a function G, if G is independent of sPRF {Fk}k∈K, then∣∣∣∣ Prk←K[AFk,G() = 1]− Prf←Funcn[Af,G() = 1]
∣∣∣∣ < ǫ(n),
where A is any QPT adversary and ǫ(n) is negligible.
Lemma 3: Given a function G, if G is independent of qPRF {Fk}k∈K, then∣∣∣∣ Prk←K[A|Fk〉,|G〉() = 1]− Prf←Funcn[A|f〉,|G〉() = 1]
∣∣∣∣ < ǫ(n),
where A is any QPT adversary and ǫ(n) is negligible.
Remark 1: If G is a PRF {Gk}k∈K and is independent of {Fk}k∈K, then the results in Lemmas 1,2 and 3 hold as well.
Theorem 3 (Parallel Composition): If {Fk}k∈K and {Gk}k∈K are two independent sPRFs, then Hk = (Fk1 , Gk2), ∀k =
k1 ‖ k2 is also a sPRF. That is, for any QPT adversary A, there exists a negligible function ǫ(n) such that∣∣∣∣ Prk←K×K[AHk() = 1]− Prf←Func2n[Af () = 1]
∣∣∣∣ < ǫ(n).
Proof: According to Definition 2, if F is a sPRF, then for any QPT adversary A1 there exists a negligible function ǫ1(n)
such that ∣∣∣∣ Prk←K[AFk1 () = 1]− Prf1←Funcn[Af11 () = 1]
∣∣∣∣ < ǫ1(n).
5If G is a sPRF, then for any QPT adversary A2 there exists a negligible function ǫ2(n) such that∣∣∣∣ Prk←K[AGk2 () = 1]− Prf2←Funcn[Af22 () = 1]
∣∣∣∣ < ǫ2(n).
Thus for any QPT adversary A, we have the following deduction according to Lemma 2 and Remark 1.∣∣∣∣ Prk1←K,k2←K[AFk1 ,Gk2 () = 1]− Prf1←Funcn,f2←Funcn[Af1,f2() = 1]
∣∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣∣ Prk1←K,k2←K[AFk1 ,Gk2 () = 1]− Prf1←Funcn,k2←K[Af1,Gk2 () = 1]
∣∣∣∣
+
∣∣∣∣ Prf1←Funcn,k2←K[Af1,Gk2 () = 1]− Prf1←Funcn,f2←Funcn[Af1,f2() = 1]
∣∣∣∣
< ǫ1(n) + ǫ2(n).
Let ǫ(n) = ǫ1(n) + ǫ2(n), then ǫ(n) is negligible. Let Hk = (Fk1 , Gk2) and f = (f1, f2). Thus complete the proof.
C. EHE encryption
In Ref. [13], Yang and Liang have improved the security of quantum McEliece PKE using double-encryption technology.
Here, the “double-encryption” is named as “EHE encryption”. The new name “EHE encryption” can accurately reflect its
structural characteristic.
Based on EHE encryption, secure quantum encryption scheme can be constructed by combining two insecure ones. EHE
is a universal technology for the construction of quantum cryptographic schemes. The basic framework can be summarized in
the following three steps: (1) Encrypt using the first insecure quantum encryption scheme; (2) Perform transversal Hadamard
transformation; (3) Encrypt again using the second insecure quantum encryption scheme.
Suppose (Gi, Ei, Di), i = 1, 2 are the two insecure quantum encryption schemes, where Gi,Ei,Di represent the key
generation, encryption and decryption algorithms, respectively.H(·) is the transversal Hadamard transformation being performed
on all the input qubits. General framework of EHE encryption is completely described in the following three algorithms.
• KeyGen(1n): k1 ← G1(1n), k2 ← G2(1n), output k1, k2;
• Enc(k1, k2, σ): σ1 ← E1(k1, σ), σ2 ← H(σ1), ρ← E2(k2, σ2), output ρ;
• Dec(k1, k2, ρ): ρ1 ← D2(k2, ρ), ρ2 ← H(ρ1), σ ← D1(k1, ρ2), output σ.
The two encryption schemes (Gi, Ei, Di), i = 1, 2 should satisfy the conditions Di(ki, Ei(ki, σ)) = σ,∀σ, i = 1, 2. It is
straightforward that
Dec(k1, k2, Enc(k1, k2, σ)) = σ, ∀σ,
so the combined construction can decrypt the ciphertext correctly.
III. QUANTUM BLOCK ENCRYPTION
A. Some definitions
[[pk, Uk, k ∈ K]] is a kind of symmetric-key quantum encryption scheme, where each key k is chosen with probability pk
and cannot be reused. In this section, we propose the QBE scheme, which is another kind of symmetric-key scheme, and its
secret key can be reused for many times.
Definition 4 (QBE): QBE scheme is defined by a triplet (KeyGen,Enc,Dec), whereKeyGen,Enc,Dec are key generation,
encryption and decryption algorithms, respectively. K is the key space, and HM and HC are the quantum plaintext/ciphertext
spaces. The randomness R is optional.
• KeyGen: Given a security parameter n, it generates a secret key k ∈ K;
• Enc: Choose a random number r ∈ R and perform the encryption transformation Enc : K ×HM → R ×HC with the
key k ∈ K;
• Dec: Perform the decryption transformation Dec : K ×R×HC → HM with the key k ∈ K.
These algorithms satisfy the condition Dec(k,Enc(k, σ)) = σ, ∀k ∈ K, σ ∈ HM .
Similar to the security notions of classical encryption, we can define the quantum versions of indistinguishability (IND),
indistinguishability against chosen plaintext attack (IND-CPA).These definitions can also be referred to Refs. [14] [16] [28].
Notice that, indistinguishability for quantum encryption is originally defined in Ref. [28]. Later, Broadbent and Jeffery [33]
presents a definition of quantum IND-CPA with an interactive game, and gives no explicit definition of IND. Following the
definition in Ref. [33], Ref. [16] defines IND, IND-CPA and IND-CCA with an incremental way instead of interactive game.
The incremental definition is very brief and is adopted in our manuscript.
6Definition 5 (IND): A QBE scheme (KeyGen,Enc,Dec) is IND-secure, if for any QPT adversary A,∣∣∣∣∣Pr[A(∑
k∈K
pkEnc(k, σ1)) = 1]− Pr[A(
∑
k∈K
pkEnc(k, σ2)) = 1]
∣∣∣∣∣ < ǫ(n),
where ǫ(n) is negligible, σ1, σ2 are arbitrary quantum states chosen by the adversary from HM , pk = Pr[k ← KeyGen(1n)],
and the probability in these terms is taken over the internal randomness of the algorithms KeyGen, Enc and A.
Next, we introduce another definition of IND.
Definition 6 (IND): A QBE scheme (KeyGen,Enc,Dec) is IND-secure, if for any QPT adversary A,∣∣∣∣∣Pr[A(∑
k∈K
pkEnc(k, σ)) = 1]− Pr[A(
∑
k∈K
pkEnc(k,
I
2n
)) = 1]
∣∣∣∣∣ < ǫ(n),
where ǫ(n) is negligible, σ is arbitrary quantum state chosen by the adversary from HM , pk = Pr[k ← KeyGen(1n)], and
the probability in these terms is taken over the internal randomness of the algorithms KeyGen, Enc and A.
Obviously, the two definitions of IND are equivalent. The reason is as follows: (1)if a QBE scheme satisfies Defini-
tion 5, let σ2 =
I
2n , then the QBE scheme satisfies Definition 6 too; (2)if a QBE scheme satisfies Definition 6, then|Pr[A(∑k∈K pkEnc(k, σ1)) = 1] − Pr[A(∑k∈K pkEnc(k, σ2)) = 1]| < 2ǫ(n) and the QBE scheme satisfies Definition
5 too.
Definition 7 (IND-CPA): A QBE scheme (KeyGen,Enc,Dec) is IND-CPA-secure, if it is IND-secure when the QPT
adversary A is allowed to access to the encryption oracle Enc(k, ∗), where k is the secret key.
IND and IND-CPA define the computational security. In addition, we can define information-theoretic security, e.g. perfect
security. Actually, QOTP is a kind of perfectly secure quantum encryption. In quantum cryptography, there exist some other
cryptographic schemes that can achieve perfect security.
Definition 8 (Perfect Security): A QBE scheme (KeyGen,Enc,Dec) is perfectly secure, if Definition 5 (or Definition 6)
holds for ǫ(n) ≡ 0 when A is computationally unbounded quantum adversary.
In QOTP [[pab =
1
22n , X
aZb, a, b ∈ {0, 1}n]], a secret key of 2n bits is necessary for perfectly encrypting n qubits. Suppose
we set a restriction on a and b such that a ≡ b, then we get a new encryption scheme [[pc = 12n , XcZc, c ∈ {0, 1}n]]. The
length of the key would decrease to n, however, the security will also decrease.
Proposition 1: The quantum encryption scheme [[pc =
1
2n , X
cZc, c ∈ {0, 1}n]] is not IND-secure.
Proof: Suppose n = 1. Two quantum states 1√
2
(|0〉 + i|1〉) and |0〉 are chosen as the challenge messages. Consider the
two messages are encrypted. The density matrixes of the two messages are written as σ1 and σ2, respectively.
The key c ∈ {0, 1} is chosen with probability 12 . Because the adversary does not know the value of c, the ciphertexts
corresponding to σ1 and σ2 should be represented as two mixed states ρ1, ρ2.
ρ1 =
∑
c∈{0,1}
pcEnc(c, σ1) =
1
2
Enc(0, σ1) +
1
2
Enc(1, σ1) =
(
1/2 −i/2
i/2 1/2
)
,
ρ2 =
∑
c∈{0,1}
pcEnc(c, σ2) =
1
2
Enc(0, σ2) +
1
2
Enc(1, σ2) =
(
1/2 0
0 1/2
)
.
The trace distance of the two ciphertexts is D(ρ1, ρ2) =
1
2 , and the adversary can efficiently distinguish the ciphertexts of σ1
and σ2. In fact, the adversary chooses { 1√2 (|0〉+ i|1〉), 1√2 (|0〉 − i|1〉)} as the measurement basis. If the adversary measures
ρ1 in the basis, he can obtain
1√
2
(|0〉 + i|1〉) with probability 1; If the adversary measures ρ2 in the basis, he can obtain
1√
2
(|0〉+ i|1〉) with probability 12 , and obtain 1√2 (|0〉− i|1〉) with probability 12 . Thus, the adversary can efficiently distinguish
ρ1 and ρ2 with successful probability
3
4 .
For any value of n, we choose the two states 1√
2n
(|0〉 + i|1〉)⊗n and |0〉⊗n as the challenge messages, and analyze the
security in the same way. Then the adversary can efficiently distinguish their ciphertexts with successful probability 1 − 14n .
Thus complete the proof.
B. An insecure construction from classical block encryption
Next, we introduce the PRF-based classical BE scheme E(F ), and construct a QBE scheme E ′(F ) which is insecure.
Construction 1(Construction 5.3.9 in Ref. [29]): Let F : K × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n be a PRF. Define classical BE scheme
E(F ) = (GF , EF , DF ) as follows.
• GF (1n): k
R←− K, output k;
• EF (k,m): r
R←− {0, 1}n, c← m⊕ F (k, r), output (r, c);
• DF (k, (r, c)): m← c⊕ F (k, r), output m.
7Based on the classical scheme E(F ), we can construct a QBE scheme E ′(F ) = (G′F , E′F , D′F ) for encrypting any n-qubit
message.
Construction 2: Let E(F ) = (GF , EF , DF ) be a classical BE scheme defined in Construction 1, define the QBE scheme
E ′(F ) = (G′F , E′F , D′F ) as follows.
• G′F (1
n): k ← GF (1n), output k;
• E′F (k, σ): r
R←− {0, 1}n, ρ← XF (k,r)σXF (k,r), output (r, ρ);
• D′F (k, (r, ρ)): σ ← XF (k,r)ρXF (k,r), output σ.
Assume without loss of generality that the quantum message is a pure state
∑
m αm|m〉, where
∑
m |αm|2 = 1. According
to the encryption operator E′F defined in Construction 2, the obtained ciphertext is also pure state, which can be written as∑
c αc|c〉.
E′F (k,
∑
m
αm|m〉) =
(
r,
∑
m
αm|m⊕ F (k, r)〉
)
,
D′F (k, (r,
∑
c
αc|c〉)) =
∑
c
αc|c⊕ F (k, r)〉.
Next we show that the QBE scheme E ′(F ) in Construction 2 is insecure.
Theorem 4: The QBE scheme E ′(F ) = (G′F , E′F , D′F ) in Construction 2 is not IND-secure.
Proof: Choose two quantum plaintexts |ϕ1〉 = 1√2n
∑
m∈{0,1}n |m〉 and |ϕ2〉 = |0〉⊗n. Suppose the secret key is k, the
ciphertexts of |ϕ1〉 and |ϕ2〉 are
E′F (k, |ϕ1〉) = (r,
1√
2n
∑
m∈{0,1}n
|m⊕ F (k, r)〉)
= (r,
1√
2n
∑
m∈{0,1}n
|m〉) = (r, |ϕ1〉),
E′F (k, |ϕ2〉) = (r, |F (k, r)〉).
With respect to the adversary (who does not know the key k), the ciphertexts of |ϕ1〉 and |ϕ2〉 should be written in the mixed
states as follows. ∑
k∈K
pkE
′
F (k, |ϕ1〉) = (r, |ϕ1〉〈ϕ1|),
∑
k∈K
pkE
′
F (k, |ϕ2〉) = (r,
1
|K|
∑
k∈K
|F (k, r)〉〈F (k, r)|).
The adversary performs quantum measurement on the ciphertexts in the basis {|+〉, |−〉}. Because |ϕ1〉 = |+〉⊗n, while
measuring its ciphertext, the outcome would be 00 · · ·0 with probability 1; While measuring the ciphertext of |ϕ2〉, the
outcome would be 00 · · · 0 with probability at most 1|K|
∑
k∈K
1
2n =
1
2n . Thus, the adversary can successfully distinguish the
two ciphertexts with probability at least 1− 12n . Thus complete the proof.
Theorem 4 can be extended to the case that replacing E(F ) = (GF , EF , DF ) with any quasi-length-preserving encryption
scheme. See the eprint version of Ref. [30] for the definition of quasi-length-preserving encryption.
Theorem 5: Given any quasi-length-preserving classical BE scheme, the QBE scheme constructed according to Construction
2 is not IND-secure.
Proof: The proof is similar to Theorem 4.
From Theorems 4 and 5, it is insecure to use any quasi-length-preserving classical BE schemes in the following two cases.
The first case is that the classical scheme is directly used to encrypt quantum superpositions on the quantum computer. The
second case is that the classical scheme is embedded into the quantum cryptographic protocols.
C. IND-CPA quantum block encryption
If F and G are PRFs, two insecure QBE schemes can be defined following the constructions in Section III-B. Denote the
two schemes as E ′(F ) = (G′F , E′F , D′F ) and E ′(G) = (G′G, E′G, D′G), respectively. Next, we propose a secure QBE scheme
E(F,G) = (KeyGen,Enc,Dec) following the framework of EHE encryption.
Construction 3: Given two schemes E ′(F ) = (G′F , E′F , D′F ) and E ′(G) = (G′G, E′G, D′G), define a new QBE scheme
E(F,G) = (KeyGen,Enc,Dec) as follows.
• KeyGen(1n): k1 ← G′F (1n), k2 ← G′G(1n), output (k1, k2);
• Enc(k1, k2, σ): (r1, σ1)← E′F (k1, σ),σ2 ← H(σ1), (r2, ρ)← E′G(k2, σ2), output (r1, r2, ρ);
• Dec(k1, k2, (r1, r2, ρ)): σ2 ← D′G(k2, (r2, ρ)), σ1 ← H(σ2), σ ← D′F (k1, (r1, σ1)), output σ.
8According to the QBE scheme E(F,G) defined in Construction 3, we encrypt n qubits σ with the keys k1, k2, and obtain
Enc(k1, k2, σ) = (r1, r2, U
F,G
k1,k2
(r1, r2)σ(U
F,G
k1,k2
(r1, r2))
†)
△
= (r1, r2, ρ), (3)
where UF,Gk1,k2(r1, r2) = X
G(k2,r2)H⊗nXF (k1,r1).
We decrypt the ciphertext (r1, r2, ρ) with the keys k1, k2, and obtain
Dec(k1, k2, (r1, r2, ρ)) = (U
F,G
k1,k2
(r1, r2))
†ρUF,Gk1,k2(r1, r2). (4)
Notice that
XG(k2,r2)H⊗nXF (k1,r1)σXF (k1,r1)H⊗nXG(k2,r2) = H⊗nZG(k2,r2)XF (k1,r1)σXF (k1,r1)ZG(k2,r2)H⊗n. (5)
Then we can make a slight modification to the encryption/decryption operators (in Equations (3) and (4)) as follows.
Enc(k1, k2, σ) = (r1, r2, Z
G(k2,r2)XF (k1,r1)σXF (k1,r1)ZG(k2,r2)), (6)
Dec(k1, k2, (r1, r2, ρ)) = X
F (k1,r1)ZG(k2,r2)ρZG(k2,r2)XF (k1,r1). (7)
It can be seen that, the only modification is that the quantum operator H⊗n is discarded. Because the operator H⊗n does not
contain variable parameters, the modification would not affect its security essentially. However, there exists a slight disadvantage
that is analyzed as follows.
Upon the modifications (defined by Equations (6) and (7)), if |m〉 is encrypted with the keys k1, k2 and the randomness
are r1, r2, then the ciphertext would be |m⊕ F (k1, r1)〉 (ignoring the global phase which depends on G); If the ciphertext is
encrypted and the same randomness r1, r2 are used, then the original message |m〉 would be restored. In the same way, we
consider the original QBE scheme (defined by Equations (3) and (4)). If |m〉 is encrypted twice in sequence using the same
randomness, then we can obtain |m⊕F (k1, r1)⊕G(k2, r2)〉, instead of |m〉. For this tiny difference, we decide to choose the
original scheme in Construction 3. That is, the Hadamard transformation H⊗n is kept in the scheme.
It can be seen that the QBE scheme E(F,G) = (KeyGen,Enc,Dec) is very similar to QOTP. The difference is that, the
QOTP-key is replaced with the pseudorandom numbers generated from the PRFs F,G with the keys k1, k2 and randomness
r1, r2. According to Construction 3, the keys of the PRFs (or classical BE schemes) are used as the key of QBE scheme
E(F,G). Because the keys of the PRFs (or classical BE schemes) can be reused, the key of E(F,G) can also be reused.
However, the randomness r1, r2 cannot be reused, or else the security would decrease. The proof is as follows.
Proposition 2: For the QBE scheme E(F,G) = (KeyGen,Enc,Dec) defined in Construction 3, if it is allowed to reuse
the randomness (r1, r2), then the scheme is not IND-CPA-secure.
Proof: Let k1, k2 be the secret key of QBE scheme, and choose the randomness (r1, r2). For the first time, the sender
encrypts the quantum message σ, and obtains the ciphertext
Enc(k1, k2, σ) = (r1, r2, U
F,G
k1,k2
(r1, r2)σ(U
F,G
k1,k2
(r1, r2))
†)
△
= (r1, r2, ρ).
In the CPA model, the adversary is allowed to access to the quantum encryption oracle. Given the input ρ, the adversary can
query the quantum encryption oracle OEnc(k1,k2,∗). If the randomness (r1, r2) are reused, then the adversary would obtain the
new ciphertext
OEnc(k1,k2,∗)(ρ) = (r1, r2, U
F,G
k1,k2
(r1, r2)ρ(U
F,G
k1,k2
(r1, r2))
†) = (r1, r2, XcZcσZcXc),
where c
△
= F (k1, r1)⊕G(k2, r2). The ciphertextXcZcσZcXc can be viewed as the outcome of performing quantum encryption
scheme [[pc =
1
2n , X
cZc, c ∈ {0, 1}n]] on the quantum message σ. From Proposition 1, we conclude the QBE scheme in
Construction 3 is not IND-CPA-secure if the randomness is reused.
According to Proposition 2, while applying the QBE scheme E(F,G), the randomness r1, r2 cannot be reused, and should
be chosen randomly in every execution of encryption.
Next we prove the security of QBE scheme E(F,G) in Construction 3.
Theorem 6: If F,G : K × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n are two independent sPRFs, then E(F,G) = (KeyGen,Enc,Dec) in
Construction 3 is an IND-CPA-secure QBE scheme.
Proof: If the scheme in Construction 3 adapts the truly random functions f1, f2 ∈ Funcn (instead of PRFs F,G), then
the scheme E(f1, f2) would be the same as QOTP. So the scheme would have perfect security.
Next we show the QBE scheme is IND-secure while using the two sPRFs F and G.
According to the QBE scheme, if totally mixed state I2n is encrypted, the outcome is (r1, r2,
I
2n ), where r1, r2 are chosen
randomly. Given any QPT adversaryA, assume A can distinguish the two ciphertexts of arbitrary state σ and I2n with advantage∣∣∣∣∣∣Pr

A(r1, r2, 1|K|2 ∑
k1,k2
UF,Gk1,k2(r1, r2)σ(U
F,G
k1,k2
(r1, r2))
†) = 1

− Pr [A(r1, r2, I
2n
) = 1
]∣∣∣∣∣∣ = ǫ(n). (8)
9Then we prove ǫ(n) is negligible as follows. For the pair of sPRFs (F,G), we construct a distinguisher D invoking the QPT
adversary A. The distinguisher D can classically query a pair of functions, and should make a judgement about the queried
functions, e.g. the queried functions are a pair of PRFs (F,G) or truly random functions (f1, f2).
Construction of distinguisher D. D is given an input 1n and a pair of classical random oracles (O1, O2), where Oi :
{0, 1}n → {0, 1}n, i = 1, 2.
1) Choose a pair of random values r1, r2 ∈ {0, 1}n;
2) Access to the pair of classical random oracles (O1, O2) with input r1, r2, and obtain the outcome (s1, s2) = (O1(r1), O2(r2));
3) Randomly choose a plaintext σ (σ 6= I2n ). The output (s1, s2) is used as the key to encrypt σ as follow: σ →
(r1, r2, X
s2H⊗nXs1σXs1H⊗nXs2); Denote the ciphertext as (r1, r2, ρ);
4) Invoke the QPT adversary A on input (r1, r2, ρ), and output whatever A does.
In the above distinguisher, D may access two kinds of classical random oracles. The first one is for truly random functions
(f1, f2), and the second one is for PRFs (F,G). We discuss the two cases as follows.
(a) If D access to the truly random functions (f1, f2), then (s1, s2) is a random element in {0, 1}2n. In addition, the
value of (s1, s2) is not accessible to A in the distinguisher. From the aspect of A, the ciphertext (r1, r2, ρ) can be
written as a mixed state (r1, r2,
1
22n
∑
s1,s2
Xs2H⊗nXs1σXs1H⊗nXs2) (That is (r1, r2, I2n )). Thus,
Pr[Df1,f2() = 1] = Pr[A(r1, r2, I
2n
) = 1], (9)
where f1, f2 are chosen randomly and independently from the set Funcn.
(b) If D access to PRFs (F,G), then (s1, s2) = (F (k1, r1), G(k2, r2)). From the aspect of A (who does not know k1, k2),
the ciphertext (r1, r2, ρ) can be written as (r1, r2,
1
|K|2
∑
k1,k2
UF,Gk1,k2(r1, r2)σ(U
F,G
k1,k2
(r1, r2))
†). It can be concluded
that
Pr[DFk1 ,Gk2 () = 1] = Pr[A(r1, r2, 1|K|2
∑
k1,k2
UF,Gk1,k2(r1, r2)σ(U
F,G
k1,k2
(r1, r2))
†) = 1], (10)
where k1, k2 ∈ K are chosen randomly and independently.
From the equations (8)(9)(10), it can be deduced that
|Pr[DFk1 ,Gk2 () = 1]− Pr[Df1,f2() = 1]| = ǫ(n). (11)
A is a QPT algorithm, then the distinguisher D invoking A is also a QPT algorithm. Using Theorem 3, if F,G are sPRFs,
then ǫ(n) in Equation (11) is negligible. From Equation (8) and Definition 6, the QBE scheme E(F,G) is IND-secure.
Consider the case that the adversary A is allowed to access to quantum encryption oracle
OEnc(k1,k2,∗) : σ → (r1, r2, UF,Gk1,k2(r1, r2)σ(U
F,G
k1,k2
(r1, r2))
†).
If the randomness used by OEnc(k1,k2,∗) have also been used in challenge query, then it would be insecure (According to
Proposition 2, the advantage of A while distinguishing the challenge ciphertexts would be non-negligible). However, the
encryption oracle will use a fresh randomness that is chosen uniformly and independently, so the probability that OEnc(k1,k2,∗)
uses the same randomness as the challenge query is negligible. Then allowing A to access to encryption oracle OEnc(k1,k2,∗)
has negligible effect on all the above proof of IND security. Thus the QBE scheme E(F,G) is IND-CPA-secure.
Remark 2: From the proof of Theorem 6, the distinguisher can classically access to the oracles of PRFs (or truly random
functions). The PRFs are not required to have quantum security. The PRFs with standard security are sufficient to assure the
IND security of the QBE scheme.
Corollary 3.6.7 in Ref. [29] has shown that the existence of one-way function implies the existence of PRF. Zhandry [24] has
proved that, if PRF exists then there exists sPRF that is not qPRF. Thus, from Theorem 6, we reduce IND-CPA-secure QBE
scheme to the existence of one-way function. That is, if there exist one-way functions, then IND-CPA-secure QBE schemes
exist as well.
Definition 9: A function F : K × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n is pairwise independent sPRF, if the two probability distributions
(Fk1 (Un), Fk2(Un)),k1, k2 ∈ K and f(U2n) are QPT-indistinguishable, where Un is uniformly distributed over {0, 1}n and f
is a truly random function in Func2n. That is∣∣∣∣ Pr(k1,k2)←K×K[AFk1 ,Fk2 () = 1]− Prf←Func2n[Af () = 1]
∣∣∣∣ < ǫ(n),
where ǫ(n) is negligible, and A is any QPT adversary. A accesses to the two functions Fk1(∗), Fk2(∗) with two independent
inputs (the two inputs may be the same or different).
If F is a pairwise independent PRF, let G = F , then a QBE scheme E(F, F ) = (KeyGen,Enc,Dec) can be constructed
from EHE encryption technology.
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Construction 4: Given a pairwise independent PRF F : K × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n, an insecure QBE scheme E ′(F ) =
(G′F , E
′
F , D
′
F ) can be constructed following Constructions 1 and 2. Then a secure QBE scheme E(F, F ) = (KeyGen,Enc,Dec)
can be constructed as follows.
• KeyGen(1n): k1 ← G′F (1n), k2 ← G′F (1n), output (k1, k2);
• Enc(k1, k2, σ): (r1, σ1)← E′F (k1, σ), σ2 ← H(σ1), (r2, ρ)← E′F (k2, σ2), output (r1, r2, ρ);
• Dec(k1, k2, (r1, r2, ρ)): σ2 ← D′F (k2, (r2, ρ)), σ1 ← H(σ2), σ ← D′F (k1, (r1, σ1)), output σ.
Theorem 7: If F is a pairwise independent PRF and has standard security, then E(F, F ) in Construction 4 is an IND-CPA-
secure QBE scheme.
Proof: The proof is similar to Theorem 6. Definition 9 is used in the proof. The details are omitted.
D. Perfectly secure case
In Section III-C, the QBE scheme in Construction 3 has been proved to be IND-CPA-secure. Next we show the QBE scheme
can achieve higher security in a particular case.
It is well known that, BE cannot achieve the same security as OTP in classical cryptography. However, based on quantum
mechanics, there may be an important breakthrough – QBE can achieve the same security as QOTP. Next we show the QBE
scheme E(F,G) = (KeyGen,Enc,Dec) can achieve perfect security in certain special case.
Theorem 8: Given two independent sPRFs F,G : K × X → Y , where K = X = Y = {0, 1}n, if for any fixed x, both
F (∗, x) : K → Y and G(∗, x) : K → Y are permutations, then E(F,G) in Construction 3 is a perfectly secure QBE scheme.
Notice that, Theorem 10 proves a special case of the scheme in Theorem 6 with only one additional limitation on the
functions F,G. So the reusability of the key would not be affected. We have presented a strict proof that, the security is
enhanced with this additional limitation, and achieve the same level as QOTP.
Proof: From Theorem 6, E(F,G) in Construction 3 is an IND-CPA-secure QBE scheme. Next we prove it can achieve
perfect security if F (∗, x) and G(∗, x) are permutations.
Suppose a block of quantum plaintext has n qubits, and its density operator σ can be written as a 2n× 2n matrix with trace
tr(σ) = 1. Given a set of all 2n × 2n matrixes, it is an inner space if we define inner product as (M1,M2) = tr(M1M †2 ),
where M1 and M2 are 2
n × 2n matrixes. Then the set {XαZβ|α, β ∈ {0, 1}n} is a group of complete orthogonal bases.
Thus the density operator σ can be expressed as σ =
∑
α,β aα,βX
αZβ , where aα,β =
1
2n tr(σZ
βXα). According to the QBE
scheme E(F,G), quantum plaintext σ is encrypted with the keys k1, k2 ∈ {0, 1}n as follows.
Enc(k1, k2, σ) = (r1, r2,
∑
α,β
aα,βU
F,G
k1,k2
(r1, r2)X
αZβ(UF,Gk1,k2(r1, r2))
†).
The keys k1, k2 are unknown by the adversary and every k1, k2 are used with identical probability. Thus, from the aspect
of the adversary, the quantum ciphertext should be represented as an equal mixture of a quantum plaintext σ encrypted under
all possible keys with uniform probability
1
22n
∑
k1,k2
Enc(k1, k2, σ) = (r1, r2,
1
22n
∑
α,β
aα,β
∑
k1,k2
UF,Gk1,k2(r1, r2)X
αZβ(UF,Gk1,k2(r1, r2))
†).
Using the following three equations
ZβXF (k1,r1) = (−1)β⊙F (k1,r1)XF (k1,r1)Zβ, (12)
H⊗nXαZβH⊗n = ZαXβ, (13)
XG(k2,r2)Zα = (−1)α⊙G(k2,r2)ZαXG(k2,r2), (14)
one can conclude that
1
22n
∑
k1,k2
Enc(k1, k2, σ) = (r1, r2,
1
22n
∑
α,β
aα,β
∑
k1,k2
(−1)β⊙F (k1,r1)(−1)α⊙G(k2,r2)ZαXβ). (15)
If F (∗, r1) : K → Y and G(∗, r2) : K → Y are permutations, then
1
2n
∑
k1
(−1)β⊙F (k1,r1) = δβ,0, ∀β ∈ {0, 1}n, (16)
1
2n
∑
k2
(−1)α⊙G(k2,r2) = δα,0, ∀α ∈ {0, 1}n, (17)
where the function δx,y =
{
1, x=y;
0, otherwise.
Using Equations (16)(17), it can be deduced that
1
22n
∑
k1,k2
Enc(k1, k2, σ) = (r1, r2,
∑
α,β
aα,βδα,0δβ,0Z
αXβ) = (r1, r2, a0,0I) = (r1, r2,
tr(σ)
2n
I) = (r1, r2,
I
2n
). (18)
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The facts aα,β = tr(σZ
βXα)/2n and tr(σ) = 1 are used in the above deduction. r1, r2 are randomly chosen and are
independent of the plaintext. Then the adversary can obtain nothing from the quantum ciphertext (r1, r2,
I
2n ). Thus the QBE
scheme E(F,G) has perfect security.
Because the perfectly secure QBE scheme is just a special case of the constructions in previous sections, the related results
and discussions in Section III-C are also suitable for the perfectly secure QBE scheme. So the keys k1, k2 are reusable and
would not decrease the security. If the randomness (r1, r2) are reused, the security would decrease.
Notice that the key can be reused and the randomness cannot. The randomness r1, r2 has exponential different choices, so
a 2n-bit key can be used in an exponential number of encryptions, where the randomness will be refreshed in each time of
encryption. Thus 2n-bit key can perfectly encrypt O(n2n) qubits, and the perfect secrecy would not be broken if the 2n-bit
key is reused only exponential times.
Remark 3: In Theorem 8, the functions F,G should satisfy two conditions: (1) they are independent sPRFs; (2) for any fixed
x, both F (∗, x) and G(∗, x) are permutations. We argue that E(F,G) cannot be a perfectly secure QBE if the condition (1)
does not hold. For example, let F (k1, r1) = k1⊕r1 and G(k2, r2) = k2⊕r2, then both F (∗, r1) and G(∗, r2) are permutations.
So Enc(k1, k2, σ) = (r1, r2, H
⊗nZk2⊕r2Xk1⊕r1σXk1⊕r1Zk2⊕r2H⊗n). Because r1, r2 are public, the encryption is equivalent
to QOTP (k1, k2, σ) = Z
k2Xk1σXk1Zk2 . Thus the keys k1, k2 cannot be reused, and E(F,G) is not a QBE.
Remark 4: In Theorem 8, the sPRF F (or G) is required that, for any fixed x, the function F (∗, x) (or G(∗, x)) is
permutation on the key space K = {0, 1}n. In fact, a good candidate is GGM-PRF [34] construction PRFk(x1x2 · · ·xn) =
Gx1(· · ·Gxn−1(Gxn(k)) · · · ), xi ∈ {0, 1}, where G0(x), G1(x) are pseudorandom permutation from K to K.
Next, we give a detailed comparison between our scheme and QOTP, especially their relations and differences. (1) For
QOTP (see Ref. [4]), while considering the encryption of n qubits, we should use an unused 2n-bit key in each encryption,
and an used key may be chosen again with probability 122n if the key is randomly chosen. For our scheme, the key can be
reused, but a 2n-bit randomness should be sampled and an used randomness may be chosen again with probability 122n . (2) In
QOTP, the key can be used only one time and no randomness is used. In our scheme, the key can be reused, and we only need
to choose a 2n-bit randomness in each encryption. Because the randomness can be chosen from exponential candidates, our
scheme can be viewed as exponential times of n-qubit QOTP encryption with the same key. (3) In the n-qubit QOTP, the key
has 2n bits, where n can be arbitrary value. That means the length of the key is variable. In our scheme, the randomness has
2n bits, where the value n depends on the length of the key. (4) In QOTP, 2n-bit key can perfectly encrypt n qubits. In our
scheme, 2n-bit key can perfectly encrypt O(n2n) qubits, since the scheme would not be perfectly secure when the randomness
is reused. (5) Our scheme can be implemented using Pauli X and H gates, and the number is at most 3n (n is the length
of one block); the QOTP can be implemented using Pauli X gate and Z gate, and the number is at most 2n. Thus, the QBE
scheme has nearly the same difficulty and complexity as QOTP from the aspect of physical implementation. (6) QOTP can be
completely replaced with our scheme. Currently, QOTP has been used as a basic quantum primitive in various cryptographic
protocols and algorithms [1]–[3], [14], [18]. If the QOTP in these protocols or algorithms is replaced with perfectly secure
QBE scheme, then optimized schemes could be obtained.
E. Multiple-message encryption
Given a classical BE scheme, if it is IND-CPA-secure in single-message encryption, then it is also IND-CPA-secure in
multiple-message encryption. However, it is not the case for QBE scheme: QBE scheme is secure in single-message encryption,
however it may be insecure in multiple-message encryption.
In this section, we show that the perfectly secure QBE scheme E(F,G) is not perfectly secure in multiple-message encryption.
However, the multiple-message encryption would be perfectly secure if the QBE scheme is applied in the operation mode
“encrypt-decrypt-confirm”: Alice encrypts one block of message and sends it to Bob; After receiving Alice’s one block of
ciphertext, Bob decrypts it; Next, Bob confirms publicly that he has decrypted the ciphertext; Then Alice and Bob start the
next round of encrypted communication.
Given s(n) blocks of messages
⊗
1≤i≤s(n) σi, from the aspect of the adversary, the multiple-message encryption would
output 
{(ri1, ri2)}s(n)i=1 , 122n ∑
k1,k2
s(n)⊗
i=1
UF,Gk1,k2(r
i
1, r
i
2)σiU
F,G
k1,k2
(ri1, r
i
2)
†

 , (19)
where the randomness (ri1, r
i
2) is used in the encryption of ith block of messages.
Generally, Equation (19) does not equal to the following equation
{(ri1, ri2)}s(n)i=1 , s(n)⊗
i=1
1
22n
∑
k1,k2
UF,Gk1,k2(r
i
1, r
i
2)σiU
F,G
k1,k2
(ri1, r
i
2)
†

 , (20)
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The result in the proof of Theorem 8 does not hold any more. Thus, from the aspect of the adversary, the ciphertext of s(n)
blocks of messages are not equal to 
{(ri1, ri2)}s(n)i=1 , I2n2n ⊗ I2n2n ⊗ · · · ⊗ I2n2n︸ ︷︷ ︸
s(n)


Thus, the perfectly secure QBE scheme E(F,G) is not perfectly secure in multiple-message encryption. If it works in the
operation mode “encrypt-decrypt-confirm”, then the encryption of the different blocks would be independent, and it would still
be perfectly secure in every single-message encryption.
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSIONS
The EHE encryption has been described and be used in the construction of QBE scheme. Firstly, we show how to construct
an insecure QBE scheme based on PRF. Then, we propose a secure construction from two insecure QBE schemes according
to EHE encryption. It is shown that the QBE scheme is IND-CPA-secure if there exist PRFs with standard security. Finally,
we show the QBE scheme can have the same security as QOTP when the PRFs satisfy an additional condition.
As is well known that, “QKD+OTP” can perfectly encrypt classical messages in theory, and there are many applications in
practice. However, lots of interaction and communication are necessary, and the efficiency would decrease. Actually, the QBE
scheme can also be used to encrypt classical messages. For example, the classical message m can be viewed as a quantum
state |m〉, and each bit mi is encrypted to a qubit XG(k2,r2)iHXF (k1,r1)i |mi〉, which belongs to the set {|0〉, |1〉, |+〉, |−〉}.
Then, while encrypting classical messages, we can use a perfectly secure QBE scheme. Because no interaction is needed in
QBE scheme, it would be more efficient than “QKD+OTP”, and is a potential replacement of “QKD+OTP” in the future.
Theoretically, 2n-bit key can perfectly encrypt O(n2n) classical bits.
For perfect secrecy, Ref. [31] proposed a strict mathematical proof that the key must have at least the same length as the
plaintext. In Section III-D, we have shown the BE scheme based on quantum mechanics can break the limitation of perfectly
secure encryption. In QOTP, 2n-bit key is necessary to perfectly encrypt n qubits. However, in the QBE scheme, 2n-bit key
can be reused and the fresh randomness (r1, r2) are used to encrypt another n qubits, thus 2n-bit key can be used to perfectly
encrypt O(n2n) qubits.
EHE encryption is a kind of generic transformation used for the construction of quantum encryption scheme. It can
convert classical encryption or insecure quantum encryption scheme into secure quantum encryption scheme. The QBE scheme
constructed based on EHE encryption can be seen as an extension of classical BE scheme, and it is also suitable for encryption
of the classical messages. Thus, EHE encryption has established the direct connection between the quantum and classical BE
schemes.
Finally, two problems are left for the future research.
• Construct more cryptographic schemes in the EHE-like way. It is proved that Wegman-Carter MAC is insecure while au-
thenticating quantum messageAuth(ρ) [32], however, it can be converted into a secure QMA scheme in the Auth2(H(Auth1(ρ)))
pattern [17]. In addition, our results show that EHE encryption can convert an insecure QBE scheme into a secure QBE
scheme. Is there any other quantum cryptographic scheme that can be constructed in the EHE-like way?
• Replace the QOTP with the QBE in those QOTP-based (encryption, authentication or others) schemes. QOTP has been
used as an important building block in many quantum schemes. Because the perfectly secure QBE scheme in Section
III-D has many advantages, we could replace the QOTP with the QBE and expect an obvious optimization, for example,
recycling all the keys of the scheme in Ref. [18] or lifting weak authentication to total authentication [17].
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